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The cases for review during this survey year do not contain
any startling departures from previously established rules
and decisions. The Courts have aided the practitioner by in-
terpreting several of the provisions found in standard policies.
The decisions for review under this section are not as num-
erous as in years past but, once again, are greatly diversified,
thus making classification difficult.
Procedure
Only one decision requires attention under this classifica-
tion and the same case will no doubt be discussed elsewhere
in this survey under the topic, Pleading. That decision was
Vanderford v. Smith:, in which the Court held that, under the
authority of Brown v. Quinn,2 an insurance company which
had allegedly filed a policy of liability insurance on behalf
of the plaintiff, a taxicab company, pursuant to an ordinance
of the City of Union, was properly impleaded for the purpose
of a counterclaim filed by the original defendant. The
counterclaim contained allegations that the ordinance of the
City of Union, which had licensed the plaintiff taxicab com-
pany for operation, required that all operating taxicabs be
insured in specific amounts against liability for damages to
persons or property and, further, that Canal Insurance Com-
pany, which the defendant sought to implead, had filed a
liability policy pursuant thereto. The Supreme Court held
that, for the purposes of the motion to implead, these allega-
tions of the counterclaim were deemed to be true and that,
accordingly, the lower Court's denial of the motion was error.
Fraud and Misrepresentation
In Reid v. George Washington Life Ins. Co.," our Supreme
Court held that no cause of action had been stated by the
plaintiff. The attempted action was against a health and
*Member of the firm of Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, Green-
ville; A.B., 1936, University of South Carolina; LL.B., 1938, University
of South Carolina; Attorney, City of Greenville, 1949-51; member Green-
ville County, South Carolina and American Bar Associations.
1. 235 S. C. 448, 111 S. E. 2d 777 (1960).
2. 220 S. C. 426, 68 S. E. 2d 326 (1951).
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hospital insurer and the Complaint alleged that there was
fraud by the insurer's sales agent in misrepresenting the
coverage afforded by the policy. The lower court sustained
a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that, even if the
insurer's sales agent had been guilty of fraud in misrepre-
senting to the insured the extent of the coverage provided
by the policy, the insured had held the policy for seven years
before she discovered what the coverage actually was and that
she had, therefore, failed to take advantage of her opportunity
to learn what her contract provided.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the complaint
did not state a cause of action within the rule of Thomas v.
American Worker and Shumpert v. Service Life & Health
Company,5 because it did not contain any allegations of ig-
norance, illiteracy or incapacity of the insured from any
cause at the time she procured the policy or afterward.
In Blackmon v. United Insurance Co.0 the action was for
the alleged fraudulent breach of a contract of life insurance
accompanied by a fraudulent act. After the death of the
insured, the beneficiary contacted the insurer's agent and
furnished the insurer with proof of the death of the insured,
which proof indicated that the insured had been older than
the age stated on his application for the insurance. The agent
stated to the beneficiary, and to other witnesses who testified
at the trial that, upon the beneficiary's surrender of the
policy and furnishing of the proof of death, he would bring to
the beneficiary a check for the face amount of the policy,
to-wit, two hundred dollars ($200.00). Instead, the agent
returned with a check for one hundred and forty odd dollars
explaining that such amount was all the beneficiary was
entitled to under the policy because of the difference in the
age of the insured-decedent as shown on his application for
the insurance and as shown on the documents in support of
the proof of death.
The Court held that these facts, as proved upon trial, were
not sufficient to support a verdict for punitive damages
and the verdict of the lower court as to punitive damages
was reversed. However, the Court held that there was a
conflict in the proof as to the age of the decedent and,
accordingly, the matter was properly submitted to the jury
4. 197 S. C. 178, 14 S. E. 2d 886, 136 A. L. R. 1 (1941).
5. 220 S. C. 401, 68 S. E. 2d 340 (1951).
6. 235 S. C. 335, 111 S. E. 2d 552 (1959).
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which had determined this issue adversely to the insurer-
appellant. Consequently, the verdict for actual damages in
the face amount of the policy was affirmed.
The Court pointed out that Section 37-161 of the Code
limits the time within which the insurance company may
dispute the truth of the application to a period of two years
after the issuance of a policy of life insurance, but pointed out
that this section also provides that, when the age of the
person insured has been misstated, the company may at any
time adjust any amount payable or benefit accruing under
the policy to such as the premiums would have purchased
based on the true age of such insured. The Court stated that
the insurer was within its legal rights to so adjust the amount
payable under the policy, and that fraud was not to be im-
plied where one acted within his legal rights.
Disability Benefits
In Dunlap v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the appeal
was from the refusal of the lower court to require the in-
sured, a dentist, to produce records showing his income from
sources other than work or occupation, such as his outside
investments and the sale and purchase of stocks and bonds.
The insured had been receiving benefits under the subject
policy because of his total incapacity to carry on his activities
as a dentist. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
refusal to require the insured to produce these records
stating that:
The fact that an insured receives income from sources
other than work or occupation does not preclude his
recovery of disability benefits .... The insurer's conten-
tion here would lead to the strange result that a bed-
ridden, professional man is not totally disabled from
performing gainful work because he receives a substantial
income from purchasing and selling stocks and bonds.
The Court, accordingly, held that the records sought to be
produced were wholly irrelevant to the issues in the case and
the trial court properly refused to order their production.
Policy Interpretation
In Pardee v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York s the
Court had before it the interpretation of the following pro-
visions of an automobile liability policy:
7. 235 S. C. 206, 110 S. E. 2d 856 (1959).
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Part 1-Liability
to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of:
B. injury to or destruction of property including loss
of use thereof, hereinafter called 'property damages';
Exclusions
This policy does not apply under Part 1:
(g) to injury to or destruction of property owned or
transported by the insured, or property rented to or in
charge of the insured, other than a residence or private
garage.
While the insured automobile was being driven by the
plaintiff, Mrs. Beatrice C. Pardee, the accelerator stuck
causing her to run into a garage, damaging the garage in
the amount of three hundred and fifty dollars ($350.00).
(Although not stated, it is apparent that this garage was
owned by Mrs. Pardee.) The insurer refused to make pay-
ment for the damage done to the garage and suit was brought
to recover for the same and also for the alleged improper
cancellation of the policy.
The insured contended that the exclusion (g) set forth
above was not applicable because damage to a residence or
private garage was excluded from the exclusion. The insurer
contended that "a residence or private garage" was excluded
from the exclusion only when such residence or private garage
came within the definition of "property rented to or in charge
of the insured".
The Court decided that the words "other than a residence
or private garage" when considered in conjunction with
"property rented to or in charge of the insured" provided
coverage that the insured would not have had otherwise and
that the opinion of the Court was that the intention of the
parties was that the words "other than a residence or private
garage" did not apply to property owned by the insured but
[Vol. 13
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were intended to provide coverage to the policyholder in case
of liability for damage to "property rented to or in charge of
the insured". The Court further pointed out other provisions
of the policy whereby the insurer agreed "to pay on behalf
of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages" and stated that, ordinarily, one
does not become legally obligated to pay himself for damages.
The Court, accordingly, held that the defendant's motion for
non-suit as to the first cause of action should have been
granted.
In Campbell v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co.,9 our Supreme Court
laid down the rule relating to the measure of damages to
which an insured is entitled under the standard automobile
collision policy. The Court said that in such instances, where
there is a partial loss and the damaged vehicle can be repaired
and restored to its former condition and value, the cost of
repairs is the measure of liability, less any deductible sum
specified in the policy. However, where the repairs do not
place the vehicle in its former condition and value and, after
repairs have been made, there remains a loss in actual value,
the insured is entitled to compensation for such deficiency.
The Court stated that under these circumstances, some Courts
adopt as the measure of damages the difference between
the fair cash value of a car before and after the collision
while other Courts achieve substantially the same results by
adding any diminution in value to the cost of repairs. Our
Court stated that either of these methods assures fair pro-
tection under a policy of this kind and that which of the two
methods is preferable depends largely upon the facts of each
particular case but that, of course, under either, there should
be deducted the amount specified in the policies as a deductible
feature.
The case of Robinson v. Georgia Casualty & Surety Co.' 0
was tried on the circuit without a jury on a stipulation of
facts before the Honorable Bruce Littlejohn. Insofar as is
here pertinent, the following facts appear to have been un-
disputed:
Napoleon Truesdale owned a 1956 model Chevrolet automo-
bile. Eugene Truesdale, son of Napoleon Truesdale, did
not own an automobile. His driver's license had been cancelled
9. 234 S. C. 583, 109 S. E. 2d 572 (1959).
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because of a conviction of driving under the influence and
it was necessary that he have evidence of financial responsi-
bility in order to obtain a driver's license. Accordingly, he
purchased from Georgia Casualty and Surety Co., hereinafter
referred to as Georgia Casualty, an automobile liability in-
surance policy. At his request, the Georgia Casualty agent
filed with the South Carolina Highway Department what is
commonly known as SR-22, which was a certification that
Eugene Truesdale was covered by the policy, and on the
strength of which the driver's license was issued to him. The
application for the insurance policy indicated that an owner's
policy was desired, and it was an owner's policy that the agent
issued. Subsequent to Eugene Truesdale's purchase of the
Georgia Casualty policy, Napoleon Truesdale traded in the
1956 Chevrolet and purchased a 1958 Chevrolet which was
likewise registered in his name. He gave to his son, Eugene,
the unrestricted right to use the 1958 Chevrolet. On the
evening of December 18, 1957, Eugene Truesdale asked his
friend, Alonzo Robinson, to take the 1958 Chevrolet and go
to the home of Yvonne Mungo. Inez Williams was riding
in the car with Alonzo Robinson, and in the course of this
trip an accident occurred resulting in her death. Eugene
Truesdale was not in the automobile at the time of the ac-
cident.
Suit was thereafter instituted on behalf of the Estate of
Inez Williams against Alonzo Robinson, Napoleon Truesdale
and Eugene Truesdale. Eugene Truesdale and Alonzo Robin-
son, through their attorney, transmitted the summons and
complaint to Georgia Casualty, but Georgia Casualty refused
to undertake the defense of the action asserting that there was
no coverage as to the automobile described in the complaint.
Negotiations were begun whereby the attorneys for the
estate offered to settle the case for the sum of $4,500.00, which
was within the limits of the coverage provided by the policy
of Georgia Casualty. Eugene Truesdale and Alonzo Robinson
called on Georgia Casualty to pay the sum demanded and
advised that Georgia Casualty would be held for any excess
judgment under the familiar Tyger River principle. The
settlement was not concluded and, thereafter, an affidavit
of default as to Alonzo Robinson was filed, and the case as
to him was referred to a referee. After a reference was held,
the referee recommended that the plaintiff have judgment
[Vol. 13
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against the defendant, Alonzo Robinson, in the sum of $25,-
000.00 and an order for judgment by default against Robinson
in that amount was entered. Robinson then filed this action
against Georgia Casualty seeking to have the judgment paid.
Judge Littlejohn's Order was adopted as the opinion of
the Supreme Court. He held that the fact that the Georgia
Casualty policy was certified to the State Highway Depart-
ment as evidence of the financial responsibility of Eugene
Truesdale in order to allow him to obtain his driver's license
had no bearing on the case. The Judge cited Section 46-750.22
of the Code which lists the requirements of an owner's policy
and which provides that the policy must by explicit language
describe the motor vehicle to be covered by the policy and that
the policy must contain an omnibus coverage clause. The
Georgia Casualty policy which was issued as an owner's policy
fully met the requirements of this Code provision and the
trial judge held that Eugene Truesdale, insofar as the statute
was concerned, was covered so long as he was operating the
1956 Chevrolet described in the policy and that, likewise,
Alonzo Robinson would have been covered while operating this
1956 Chevrolet with the permission of Eugene Truesdale.
Section 46-750.23 of the Code was referred to as listing
the requirements of an operator's policy. That section only
requires that an operator's policy shall insure the named
insured against loss from liability imposed upon him by law
for damages arising out of the use by him of any motor vehicle
now (sic) owned by him. The Court stated that, although
the Acts of 1952 also used the word "now", the context re-
quires that the word be read as "not". The trial judge held
that, should it be concluded that because of the fact Eugene
Truesdale did not own the 1956 automobile, the policy, in
effect, became an operator's policy, it would afford coverage
only when Eugene Truesdale was operating the automobile and
that there was no reason of public policy or otherwise which
would require that Robinson be clothed with the protection of
the statute required only in the case of Eugene Truesdale. For
these reasons, the trial judge concluded that the safety re-
sponsibility statute was not to be considered and that a de-
cision would be dependent upon the terms and provisions of
the policy itself.
Georgia Casualty's policy was a standard owner's policy
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insured and anyone using the automobile with the permission
of the named insured. The term automobile was defined as be-
ing either the automobile described in the policy or a newly
acquired automobile. Newly acquired automobiles were de-
fined as being one which is acquired by the named insured
if it replaced an automobile owned by the named insured.
The Court, therefore, concluded that Robinson was not cov-
ered by the insurance policy because the automobile was
clearly not the one described in the policy and that, further,
it could not qualify as a newly acquired automobile because
of the requirement that such be an automobile ownership of
which is acquired by the named insured and only where it
replaces an automobile owned by the insured and covered by
the policy. Neither of these two requirements had been ful-
filled and, hence, there was no coverage.
In Crook v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.1 the
insurer contended that it was not liable under its automobile
liability policy because of the breach by the insured of the
cooperation clause of the policy. In this decision our Supreme
Court firmly commits itself to the rule that an insurer must
be substantially prejudiced by the failure of the insured to
cooperate and that the insured's violation of the cooperation
clause would constitute a defense available to the insurer only
where the insurer could show by the preponderance of the
evidence that such violation substantially prejudiced its posi-
tion. The Court also stated that this issue constituted a ques-
tion of fact to be determined by a jury.
Insured's False Swearing or Misrepresentation
In State Farm Fire & Gas. Co. v. Herron - the insured had
made application with the insurer to purchase fire insurance,
stating in the application that there was no other insurance
on the property. Thereafter, a fire of unknown origin totally
destroyed the insured dwelling. When the insurer's adjuster
investigated, he met with the insured who advised him that
there waa no other insurance on the premises. He, thereafter,
signed and swore to a proof of loss in his attorney's office
which proof contained his false statement that there was no
other insurance. In fact, there was other insurance covering
the dwelling and the insured was fully aware of the existence
of the same.
11. 235 S. c. 452, 112 S. E. 2d 241 (1960).
12. 269 F. 2d 421 (4th Cir. 1960).
[Vol. 13
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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out that the
policy provided that,
"The entire policy would be void if, whether before or
after a loss, the insured . . . wilfully concealed or mis-
represented any material fact..."
and that the insured knowing of the existence of the additional
insurance coverage had signed and sworn to the proof of loss
in his attorney's office. The Court of Appeals held that the
conclusion seemed inescapable as a matter of law that the
false statements on the part of the insured that there was no
other insurance were made intentionally and wilfully and with
the intent to deceive or defraud the appellant insurance com-
pany. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court was re-
versed and judgment entered for the insurance company
In Parker v. Progressive Life Insurance Co.,'3 the action
was by the beneficiary of a life insurance policy to recover
the face amount of the policy. The policy was issued on Jan-
uary 23, 1956 and the insured died on March 20-of that year.
The insurer refused to pay the face amount of the policy but
tendered in settlement the sum of $102.64 on March 3, 1957
which the respondent refused. The action was instituted on
May 24, 1958, which was more than two years after the date
of the policy.
The insurer in its answer asserted a policy provision pro-
viding as follows:
"Within two years from the date of the issuance of this
policy, the liability of the company shall be limited to
ten percent of the face amount of this policy under the
following conditions: (1) If the insured is not alive
and in sound health upon the date of issuance and de-
livery of this policy; or * * * (3) if within two years
before the date hereof the insured has been attended
by a physician for any serious disease or complaint..."
The answer further alleged that at the time of the issuance of
said policy the insured was not in sound health and that
he had been attended by a physician for a serious disease.
The tender of $102.64 represented ten percent of the face
amount of the policy.
The plaintiff demurred to the Answer upon the grounds
that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense
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because it was based upon alleged false representations made
by the insured more than two years prior to the institution
of the action and was thereby waived perforce the provisions
of CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA Section 37-161 (1952),
which statute as applicable to this case is as follows:
"All companies which issue a policy or certificate of in-
surance on the life of a person shall, after a period of two
years from the date of such policy or certificate of insur-
ance, be deemed and taken to have waived any right they
may have had to dispute the truth of the application for
insurance or to assert that the assured person had made
false representation and such application and representa-
tion shall be deemed and taken to be true..."
The demurrer was sustained upon the authority of Blzckwell
v. United Insurance Company of America.1 4
The insurer would attempt to avoid the authority of the
Blackwell case, supra, upon the theory that the condition of
the policy was an exception to, or limitation upon, the risk
assumed and is not affected by the statute. The Supreme
Court said that the answer to this contention was simply that
the condition is dependent upon the ill health of the insured
at the time of the application for, and issuance of, the policy,
or medical attention for a serious disease within the specified
time. The Court said that under the statute the appellant is
prevented by the passage of time from disputing the truth
of the application or asserting that the insured made false
representation and that applying the statute, which the Court
said was as much a part of the policy as if it had been written
into it, the insured's representations in his application that
he was in good health, etc., are true, and by the same token,
the allegations of the answer to the contrary are untrue, per-
force the statute, for the purpose of determining appellant's
liability under the policy.
The insurer further contended that its tender of the amount
which it concedes was due under the policy within two years
from the date of it fixed the rights of the parties. But the
Court said that such action by the insurer is not a sufficient
assertion of the contended right; it must be an action in
law and equity. The Court quoted authorities from other
jurisdictions to the following effect;
14. 231 S. C. 535, 99 S. E. 2d 414 (1957).
[Vol. 13
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"By the great weight of authority, a contest, within the
meaning of an incontestable clause in an insurance policy,
means some affirmative or defensive action taken in
Court to cancel the policy or prevent its enforcement,
to which the insurer and the insured, or his representa-
tives or beneficiaries are parties."
The Court further stated that the insurer -was provided a
remedy upon the facts that it alleges which it did not pursue
by virtue of CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA Section 37-162
(1952), as follows:
"Every insurance company doing a life insurance business.
in this state may institute proceedings to vacate a policy
on the ground of the falsity of the representations con-
tained in the applicaton for such policy if such proceed-
ings be commenced within two years from the date of
the policy."
In Edwards v. Great American Insurance Company,15 the
action was to recover under a fire insurance policy insuring
a one story frame tenant dwelling owned by respondent which
directed that the proceeds would be payable to the respondent
and to the respondent Bank of Great Falls as mortgagee, as
its interest might appear. The agreed value of the dwelling-
was $2,000.00 and the agreed value of a barn was $500.00 and
the policy was written for these respective amounts. The-
jury returned a verdict for the full face amount of the policy-
from which the defendant appeals.
In its answer, the defendant pleaded the provision of its.
policy prohibiting insurance in excess of the amount fixed in.
the valuation clause of the policy. The defendant insurance
company also plead the provisions of its policy providing that
where payment is made to a mortgagee under the policy where
the company claims that there is no liability, the mortgagee.
shall assign all securities held as collateral to the mortgage
debt to the insurance company who shall be subrogated to
the rights of the mortgagee. As a third defense, the insurer
plead that if the policy involved should not be held voided
because of the additional insurance obtained by the insured,
that under the laws of the State of South Carolina, the appel-
lant could only be held liable for a proportionate amount of
the insurance carried.
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The Supreme Court held that the issue as to whether the
policy had become void because of the additional insurance
which exceeded the valuation agreed upon in the policy was
properly submitted to the jury since there was sufficient
evidence of the insurance company's waiver of this provision.
With regard to the defense relative to the subrogation of
the insurer to the rights of the mortgagee, the Supreme Court
held that this assignment of error could not be sustained
because, under the provisions of the policy, payment by the
insurer of the mortgage obligation was a condition precedent
to the insurer's right to claim subrogation and no payment
had been made.
However, the Supreme Court held that, unless the insured
should remit upon the record a portion of the judgment as
computed by the Supreme Court, a new trial would be granted.
This result was reached because of Section 37-154 of the Code
which provides, inter alia, that
"If two or more policies are written upon the same
property, they shall be deemed and held to be contributive
insurance and if the aggregate sum of all such insurance
exceeds the insurable value of the property, as agreed
upon by the insurer and the insured, each company shall,
in the event of a total or partial loss, be liable for its
pro rata, share of insurance."
The Supreme Court held that the appellant had two-thirds
of the total insurance outstanding on the dwelling and that it
would, therefore, be required to pay two-thirds of the face
amount of its policy, since the dwelling had been totally de-
stroyed and that, further, the appellant had one-half of the
outstanding coverage on the barn and would, therefore, be re-
quired to pay one-half of the face amount of its policy due to
the respondent.
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